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Abstract: An empirical model has been deployed to account for regional 
industrial growth and performance in Greece’s post EU-accession period. The 
results obtained suggest that the effect of European integration on manufacturing 
has been rather adverse across Greek regions. Regions that are more 
industrialised, whose structure was more similar to the European average and 
which have been more exposed to European competition are those that have 
been more adversely affected. In contrast, higher diversity, higher presence of 
capital-intensive sectors and higher tertiarisation of the regional economies were 
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-1- 1. Introduction. 
In the last two decades, a relatively large portion of literature has been analyzing 
the impact of economic integration on a number of economic indicators, such as 
growth and structure. Given the restrictions imposed on trade of agricultural 
products and the non-tradable character of most services, this discussion is more 
interesting when it focuses on industry. 
A critical question is how less advanced industrial bases adjust to the pressures 
and opportunities generated by the process of economic integration. Are open 
markets associated with growing differences in performance among more and 
less advanced countries and regions? Is the new environment helping less 
advanced regions to converge towards the more advanced ones in terms of 
growth records and production structure?  
In the European Union, the process of integration has been associated with a 
variety of outcomes in time and space. At the national level, the most frequently 
cited success story is that of Ireland. At the opposite end of the performance 
scale, one encounters Greece, the country with the greatest difficulties (at least in 
the early years after membership). At the regional level, an even greater mosaic 
is evident, with advanced regions having, more often, a better record than their 
less advanced counterparts. 
Given that industrial activity is more exposed to the forces of integration than any 
other sector, the analysis of the adjustment of a weak or more vulnerable 
industrial base in the European periphery shows potential. Understanding the 
factors behind success and failure may have an added value for policy-making at 
a time when the European project is at a barometric low and European structural 
and cohesion policies are under scrutiny. 
The aim of this paper is to address industrial performance in the Greek regions in 
the period following its accession to the EU. In the next section we summarize the 
most interesting aspects of the broad discussion in the literature concerning 
regional performance, industrial structure and integration. Section 3 reports key 
aspects and stylized facts of the industrial experience of Greece in the post 
accession period and critically discusses the regional dimension of this 
experience. In section 4, we combine theoretical considerations with stylized facts 
and empirical evidence in order to build an empirical model of industrial 
performance at the regional level and in section 5 we present the conclusions of 





-2- 2. Theory and evidence  
Even though economists almost unanimously accept that free trade increases 
aggregate welfare (BEN-DAVID, 1993; SACHS and WERNER, 1995; EDWARDS, 
1998), an ongoing theoretical and empirical debate takes place concerning the 
distribution of these overall welfare gains (KRIEGER-BODEN, 2000; FORSLID et 
al., 2002, inter alia). In advanced economies, concerns have been expressed that 
the abolition of trade barriers and the free movement of capital will have negative 
implications for their industrial activity. In the less advanced and peripheral, 
economies, there is much skepticism regarding their ability to take advantage of 
the opportunities provided by economic integration. The main danger perceived is 
that the gap which separates these economies from their advanced counterparts 
may become wider, as the advanced ones are thought to be better adjusted (in 
terms of economic and institutional structures, human capital and technology) to 
the conditions and demands of the free-market economic environment 
(MELACHROINOS, 2002).  
Current theoretical analysis is dominated by the neoclassical, new trade and new 
economic geography schools (see BRÜLHART, 1998 for an overview of the 
principal features of each school). Neoclassical trade theory seems to better 
explain the inter-industry trade, conducted mainly among countries with different 
productive structures, whereas new trade theories and new economic geography 
are more suited to account for the intra-industry trade, conducted mainly among 
countries with similar productive structures. Empirical research has not decided 
yet about the relative importance of the above theories in driving world trade 
(DAVIS and WEINSTEIN, 1999). As KRUGMAN (1994) indicates, this question 
may not have a precise answer, and if it does, we don’t know it.  
By and large, the intra-industry type of trade activity seem to fit more to the 
cases of the countries of the EU core since during the process of economic 
integration, factor endowments and costs become more similar as firms become 
multinational, jobs and people move, innovation disseminates and legal 
frameworks become European (AIGINGER, 2000). HEAD and MAYER (2003) tried 
to list the parameters that characterize the EU economic environment, supported 
t h a t  f a c t o r  p r i c e s  t e n d  t o  b e  h i g h  i n  r e g i o n s  w i t h  g o o d  m a r k e t  a c c e s s ,  m o b i le  
sectors tend to be disproportionately clustered in these regions due to high 
demand for their goods, and reductions in trade cost induce agglomeration of 
industries.  
These parameters reveal that even small differences among regions, in an 
ongoing integration context, are of high importance and result in shifts in 
production organization and location. Under these conditions, it is possible that 
-3- countries or regions with industries associated with increasing returns to scale 
can do better than others since imperfect competition can result in adverse 
effects i.e. uneven distribution of the benefits of trade (MARTIN and OTTAVIANO, 
2001) and the possibility of some countries or regions being net losers 
(VENABLES, 1996). 
As KRUGMAN and LIVAS (1992) indicate, if the externalities generated by a 
market expansion (as they are the cases of the EU enlargements) are important, 
then higher productivity growth rates are observed in the regions spatially close 
to the new market center. Regions at a geographical disadvantage cannot benefit 
as much as others from international trade because they face higher 
transportation costs (LIMAO and VENABLES, 2001). Engaged in an integration 
process with distant and larger partners, peripheral regions will tend to develop 
unbalanced, inter-industry type trade relations, with an unfavorable impact on 
their industrial bases (PETRAKOS and CHRISTODOULAKIS, 1997). Keeping the 
principles of the above trade theories and the parameters that characterize the 
EU space in mind, it is natural to expect that the EU – having reached a critical 
level of economic integration – is going to experience an even more intense 
cumulative process of industrial concentration following the US pattern 
(AIGINGER and DAVIES, 2004). 
Radical changes have already taken place in the competitive environment of 
European manufacturing and especially in the peripheral EU regions. The pressure 
to produce high-quality products at attractive prices, forces firms to focus not 
only on low production cost but also on quality and innovation. The external 
environment of the firms – proximity to clients and suppliers, level of 
infrastructure, availability of skilled labor force, inter alia – has become the 
decisive factor that affects their location decisions (FUJITA and KRUGMAN, 1995; 
VENABLES, 1996). The EU economic integration has generated competition 
among regions (MALMBERG et al., 1996) as differences in the above factors 
contribute significantly to variations in regional competitiveness (BUDD, 1998), 
and the existence of low labor costs has lost much of its significance to 
competition (BEST, 1990). As low labor costs are typically a characteristic of less 
developed countries, the emerging new conditions removed a source of 
competitive advantage from such countries (PETRAKOS and PITELIS, 2001).  
The geographic distribution of industrial activities is characterized by 
agglomeration economies that can enhance the imbalance between the core and 
the peripheral EU regions; a fear that has been already expressed by the EU itself 
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1992). These integration dynamics may take the form 
of a cumulative process that will have an overall unfavorable impact on the 
-4- economic performance of the less developed countries and regions (AIGINGER 
and DAVIES, 2004). As a result, lagging countries and regions having the 
weakest economic base with the highest shares of sensitive (labor-intensive) 
sectors (CAMAGNI, 1992) and an unfavorable geographic index (PETRAKOS and 
ZIKOS, 1996), suffered during the process of economic integration since they 
failed to effectively redeploy their resources in order to mitigate the adverse 
effects of integration (AIGINGER, 1999).  
Adaptability is essential to the resilience to shocks and Ireland is a proof of this 
(AIGINGER, 2000). Despite being a peripheral and cohesion country, Ireland 
records a 10% annual increase in manufacturing output, having by far the highest 
share in Gross National Product (32%) and the highest productivity growth 
among the EU members. This economic miracle is the outcome of a combination 
of low wages, the supply of skilled labor, a climate in favor of innovation and a 
policy focus to establish upstream linkages between domestic and foreign firms. 
On the other hand, Greece, also a peripheral and cohesion EU country, recorded 
only slight increases in manufacturing output, and had, in the year 2000, the 
smallest share in Gross National Product (only 12%) among the EU members. 
Despite its low wages, it has been unable to attract a significant amount of 
Foreign Direct Investment. Greece thus remained a country with low productivity, 
a high presence of non-skilled labor, an increasing trade deficit, and an industrial 
base unable to adjust successfully to the new economic conditions of integration. 
The above is in line with existing evidence that economic integration within the 
EU has led to changing patterns of production and specialization among EU 
countries and regions (AMITI, 1998) and that these changes have affected the 
economic performance of countries and regions and the level of cohesion 
(KRUGMAN, 1991; PENEDER, 2003).  
A theoretical controversy exists regarding the relation of higher or lower 
specialization to growth, employment creation and competitiveness. WEINHOLD 
and RAUCH (1999) and BENITO and EZCURRA (2004) argue that an increase in 
the level of specialization leads to an increase in productivity through the 
exploitation of scale economies. The EU supports that this is only true for 
dynamic, high growth regions (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1999) whereas 
AIGINGER (2000) supports that the increase in specialization is negatively 
correlated with employment growth, at least in the short run. A somewhat 
different dimension was set to the discussion by PASINETTI (1981) who 
suggested that the degree by which the productive structures of less developed 
countries are getting more similar to the respective structures of advanced 
countries determines their potential to achieve higher rates of income growth. 
-5- LAU (1992) indirectly accepted the previous view, supporting that specialization 
in capital-intensive sectors enhances income growth. On the contrary, DALUM et 
al. (1998) supported that less developed countries or regions should differentiate 
their productive structures from those of the advanced ones in order to present 
trends of convergence.  
Additionally to the above theoretical controversy, no comprehensive empirical 
investigation is available on the issue since existing empirical work varies widely, 
with respect to spatial and temporal scales, databases and statistical methods 
used (AIGINGER 2000; COMBES and OVERMAN, 2003). GLAESER et al. (1992) in 
their study of employment growth between 1956 and 1987 in 170 U.S. standard 
metropolitan areas (SMA), found that specialization slows employment growth. In 
a different study, HENDERSON et al. (1995), using more extensive geographical 
data coverage (224 SMA) but only eight traditional capital goods industries, found 
that industrial concentration had a positive effect on employment growth between 
1970 and 1987. COMBES (2000) in his study of the impact of economic structure 
on local economic growth in France in the period 1983-1993, found that 
specialization had a negative effect on employment growth in both manufacturing 
and services sectors. The author suggested that this result may be seen in 
relation to business cycles, since specialization may enhance local employment 
growth during economic upturns but contribute to employment decline during 
downturns. In a somewhat different, but not unrelated research context, 
BALDWIN and BROWN (2004) found that specialization (as an inverse concept to 
diversity) has a positive effect on employment growth volatility (variance of 
annual regional employment growth rates). This result echoes earlier findings 
from the U.S. metropolitan areas (KORT, 1981) where diversification was found 
to be statistically significant in reducing regional economic instability. 
Contradicting are also the empirical results that concern the opposite direction of 
the above relation i.e. the relation of growth to high or low specialization. IMBS 
and WACZIARG (2000), in their survey of 67 countries for the period 1969-1997, 
concluded that less developed countries in an economic integration context start 
to present low levels of specialization until they reach a mature level of 
development when they start to specialize more intensively. KELLEHER (2003), 
on the contrary, studying 117 countries for the period 1980-1997, found a 
negative relation between income growth and specialization level. MOLLE (1997) 
studying 96 EU regions for the period 1950-1990 found that regions with lower 
income, located in the EU periphery, are associated with higher levels of 
specialization. EZCURRA et al. (2004) surveying 197 EU regions for the period 
1977-1999 found that small regions, located far from the EU core, recorded a fall 
-6- in the levels of their specialization, as they were exposed to international 
competition, and then, a respective rise, after a rather advanced level of 
economic performance. On the contrary, HALLET (2000) in a previous study 
surveying 119 EU regions for the period 1980-1995 did not find a clear pattern 
between level of income, geographical location and level of specialization. These 
contradicting results indicate that the relation between structural changes and 
economic performance has to be further investigated (BODE et al., 2004).  
 
3. Industrial performance and structure in Greece  
The industrial GDP of Greece accounts for a minuscule fraction of the relative EU-
15 figure. The industrial share of GDP has been declining in both Greece and EU-
15 (Table 1). However, this share has been about eight to nine percentage points 
lower in Greece when compared to EU-15 average. Moreover, it seems that this 
gap has been quite persistent throughout the 1980-2004 period (Figure 1). 
_______________________________Table 1____________________________ 
_______________________________Figure 1___________________________ 
Despite this gap, Greece has recently (2000-2004) managed to outperform EU-15 
in industrial GDP growth (Table 1). However, industrial labor productivity 
remained below the 60% of the corresponding EU-15 average throughout the 
1980-2004 period (Figure 2). 
_______________________________Figure 2___________________________ 
A two snap-shot comparison of the industry structure between Greece and EU-15 
helps to identify both differences in structure and its evolution between 1985 and 
2000 (Table 2). 
_______________________________Table 2____________________________ 
As an overall comparison reveals, Greek industrial structure in the mid-80s was 
dominated by labor-intensive sectors (the classification of sectors here follows 
JACKSON and PETRAKOS, 2001) as slightly more than 50% of Greek industrial 
GDP was concentrated in such sectors and about 42% in two sectors alone. 
Namely, these sectors are the Food-Beverages and Tobacco (DA) and the 
Textiles-Wearing Apparel (DB). The corresponding figures for the EU-15 were 
about 36% and 21% respectively. Over time, it appears that both in Greece and 
the EU-15, labor-intensive sectors lost their share in total industrial GDP. 
However, whereas in the EU-15 this change took place in favor of capital-
intensive sectors (as intermediate-intensity receded slightly), in Greece it was 
primarily the intermediate-intensity (IINT) group that gained ground (about 5% 
increase) and less so the capital-intensive sectors (about 2.5% increase). Beyond 
this aggregate picture drawn, some interesting branch-specific stories emerge. 
-7- Food-Beverages and Tobacco industries have further advanced in Greece over the 
1985-2000 period (about 6%) whereas at the same time they have slightly 
declined at the EU-15 average level (about 1.5%). Most dramatic is the case of 
the textile and clothing apparel sectors (DB). This manufacturing branch was 
ranked first in 1985 (accounting for 21.5% of Greece’s industrial GDP), only to 
drop to the third place by the year 2000 with its share dropping to 10.2% and 
being outperformed by both Food-Beverages and Tobacco industries as well as an 
amalgamation of fuel and chemical products industries (DF+DG). The latter group 
increased its share in total industrial GDP from 12.4% in 1985 to 18.8% in 2000. 
These, as well as other manufacturing branch stories, such as electrical 
machinery and optical equipment (DL) that almost doubled its share, but also 
fabricated metal products (DJ) at the other extreme (with an 1/3 reduction in 
share), suggest that some restructuring has taken place in Greek manufacturing. 
Greek manufacturing firms are small when compared to their European 
counterparts, since in 2002 the average manufacturing-firm size in Greece was 
the smallest in the EU-15 (about 6 employees) (Table 3). To some extent this 
may be attributed to the limited and isolated national market suggesting that 
Greek firms find it difficult to exploit economies of scale at the plant level in most 
sectors 
_______________________________Table 3____________________________ 
Despite their small size, Greek firms could still potentially reap the benefits of 
scale economies that are external to firms but internal to a group of similar firms 
located in the same region (localization economies) or that transcend both firms 
and industries but remain internal to an area (agglomeration economies). 
Whereas the former source of external economies requires some sort of regional 
specialization the latter thrives through larger diversity of economic activities 
(HENDERSON, 1986). 
Although it does not address the issue of external economies, Figure 3 helps to 
visualize both the regional distribution of GDP and its evolution over the 1981-
2000 period. It also helps to discern the spatial pattern of their association. 
_______________________________Figure 3___________________________ 
More than 60% of industrial GDP is concentrated in two NUTS III regions, namely 
those of Attiki (that contains Athens (47.2%)) and Thessaloniki (14.6%). These 
are the largest urban areas in Greece and are followed by Larissa (3%), Achaia 
(2.88%), Magnesia (2.17%), Korinthia (1.29%) and Heraklion (1.24%). The 
spatial distribution of these shares seems to point to a positive relation between 
urbanization and industrialization. However, a misfit to this relation may be the 
region of Voiotia which despite being far less urbanized, is a major industrial hub 
-8- (6.60% share in national industrial GDP) adjacent to Attiki. However, the 
information summarized in Figure 3 also suggests that most regions hosting 
urban areas have experienced industrial decline (in terms of change in their 
relative share in the country’s industrial GDP) over the period considered. A 
notable exception to this is Thessaloniki (the second largest city in Greece). 
An overview of the shares of industrial GDP within each region and its evolution, 
over the period considered, is provided in Figure 4. Here it appears that all urban 
economies in Greece have experienced a transition away from manufacturing and 
towards the tertiary sector of the economy. It also becomes equally evident that 
in the case of both Athens and Thessaloniki (but note also Heraklion) this 
tendency has been accompanied by an increase in manufacturing share in some 
of their adjacent less urbanized regions. 
_______________________________Figure 4___________________________ 
 
4. A model of regional growth performance. 
Motivated by the discussion in section 2 as well as the preliminary analysis of 
relevant data in the previous section, the aim of this part of the paper is to put 
together an empirical model of manufacturing performance at the regional level. 
To this end, two dependent variables have been used. The first is industrial GDP 
growth (INDGDPGR) and the second is labor productivity growth in the 
manufacturing sector (INDPROGR). Both variables are defined over the 1981-
2000 time-interval, in real terms. 
Base year industrial GDP (INDGDP81) and industrial labor-productivity 
(INDPROD81) have been used in the corresponding econometric growth 
formulations as control variables to capture the effects of the initial conditions on 
the consequent growth performance. A negative effect of initial conditions on 
subsequent growth may signify the advantages of backwardness 
(GERSCHENKRON, 1952) as far as less developed regions can gain from the more 
advanced ones through technological and other spillovers. In a process like this, 
less developed regions outperform the most developed ones in growth terms. In 
contrast, a positive sign may be perceived as indicating a diverging process that 
further builds on itself. 
A Theil index (THEIL, 1967; THEIL, 1972) of regional diversity (as opposed to 
regional specialization) was also used. This was calculated as follows: Let 











having the property that ∑ ∑ =
ri ri p 1. The Theil regional-diversity entropy-













log , where  i p is defined as  . This 
measure takes the value of 0 when only one sector is present in region r and the 
value ln(n) where all n sectors employ the same number of persons in the region 
in question. Interest in applying such entropy measures for the analysis of 
industrial specialization of regional economies and geographical concentration of 
industries has only recently been renewed by AIGINGER and DAVIES (2004) and 
AIGINGER and PFAFFERMAYR (2004). 
∑ =
i ri r p p .
As far as agglomeration economies need economic variety in an area 
(diversification), the Theil index is used here to assess the effect of the latter on 
regional industrial growth. A higher degree of diversification implies a higher 
variety of skills available locally. Skill and diverse working experiences can, in 
turn, give way to higher entrepreneurial choice and opportunity, especially since 
there should be some degree of transfer of individuals between not only firms but 
also industries. The latter might work as a safeguard. Downturn movements, in 
some sectors, would not be as harmful to the local economy because human and 
other resources are diverted to existing and more secure alternatives. Moreover, 
higher degrees of diversification could ensure that emerging opportunities due to, 
say increasing demand, may not go unexploited locally, if even a small number of 
firms in the industry producing the product are in the area. 
The average firm size of industrial firms in each region (AFS) was used to account 
for possible economies of scale effects that emanate from the firm-level. The 
rationale is that advantages of economies of scale may lead to an expansion of 
firms and to a higher growth of hosting regions. 
An index of integration (PETRAKOS et al., 2005a) with the EU economy for each 
of the 14 industrial sectors considered here was first calculated at the national 
level:  () ( ) ,1 5 ,1 5 , , i i EU i EU i world i world IOI EXP IMP EXP IMP −− =+ +  where i  denotes the 
industrial sector, EXP stands for exports and IMP for the imports. Subscripts EU-
15 and world refer to trade with the EU-15 and the world respectively. The higher 
the index the higher the ‘integration’ of this sector within the European economy. 
To regionalize the index, the sectoral index of integration ( i IOI ) was multiplied 
by the corresponding employment location quotient and the result was summed 
over sectors for each regions i.e.  ri
i
i r IOI IOI LQ =∗ ∑ . Higher values of the 
regional index of integration indicate that the economic base of a region has been 
more exposed to European competition. This index has been calculated for the 
-10- base year combining data from the National Statistical Service of Greece and the 
Eurostat COMEXT database. 
Within a framework of ongoing economic integration it is important to note the 
effect of a deviant (when compared to EU average) regional economic structure 
on its subsequent employment growth (see PASINETTI, 1981 and the discussion 
in section 2 of this research). The similarity or dissimilarity of regional structures 
in comparison to a representative EU regional economy was explored using an 
“Index of Dissimilarity” (IDIS). This is defined as IDIS = (ai, t – bi, t) 
2, where a 
and  b are the economies under comparison, i is the industrial sector under 
consideration and t is the year of comparison (JACKSON and PETRAKOS, 2001). A 
higher value of this index signifies more dissimilar structures. 
Most Greek regions have been traditionally specializing in labour-intensive sectors 
that were also becoming highly exposed to international competition from lower 
cost producers (Petrakos et al., 2005b). In spite of this, regional restructuring in 
the post EU-accession has been quite slow in Greece and has been attributed to 
considerable sectoral persistence in regional specialization patterns within 
manufacturing for most of the period (ibid.). The experience of Western Europe 
shows that the most advanced industrial regions are often characterized by a 
strong presence of machinery and transportation branches. The tested hypothesis 
here is that regions with a higher share of capital-intensive sectors in their 
industrial base have, ceteris paribus, a better growth performance (RAUCH, 
1993; ALONSO-VILLAR 2002). To account for some sort of early deviant regional 
specialisation patterns within Greece, the employment share of capital intensive 
sectors in regional industrial base was also included on the right hand side of the 
empirical model estimated. 
The shares in the tertiary sector (TERTGDP) in the base year, as well as in 
r e g i o n a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  ( T E R T P R O D )  i n  t h e  s a m e  s e c t o r  h a v e  b e e n  u s e d  w h e n  
accounting for regional variation in industrial GDP growth and industrial 
productivity growth respectively. A positive sign of TERTGDP would indicate that, 
ceteris paribus, a more advanced tertiary sector, due to commercial sector, public 
services or tourism, would have a positive local impact on industrial activity. This 
impact could be the outcome of significant forward and backward linkages 
between the two sectors of the economy.  Theoretically, a negative sign is also 
possible, if a trade-off between the two sectors takes place and the development 
of services is based on intensive competition in the factor markets and massive 
transfer of resources from one sector to the other.  The possible effect of linkages 
between the services and manufacturing sectors on improving the productivity of 
the latter at the regional level is explored by the inclusion of TERTPROD. 
-11- The last two variables considered refer to policy instruments. In particular, 
variable DL is defined as the percentage of investment subsidized by the state 
(Law 1262/82) and variable PCPUBINV is the per capita public investment by 
region over the period 1981-1998. 
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 4. There are two dependent 
variables, industrial GDP growth (INDGDPGR) and industrial labor-productivity 
growth (INDPROGR) and two methods of estimation. The first estimation method 
provides for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (WHITE, 1980), 
whereas the second is that of weighted least squares (WLS) using regional 
population density as the weighting factor. The latter method is used here 
following a rationale developed in earlier studies assessing the effect of regional 
diversification on regional economic instability (see KORT, 1981 and references 
therein) where it was postulated that the relationship between diversification and 
economic instability varies with city size. In these studies economic instability is 
related to some notion of time variation of growth rates. In the present study 
growth rates are of interest and regions (NUTS III) instead of cities or 
metropolitan areas are the spatial units of analysis. Thereby, population density 
as an index of urbanization within each region was used instead. 
The results obtained clearly suggest that regional diversification within 
manufacturing positively affects both industrial GDP and industrial productivity 
growth. This effect is statistically significant in both cases and robust to 
alternative econometric estimation methods. Thus, these results appear to 
vindicate theorizations according to which greater diversity may act as a 
safeguard against downturns in the demand for the regional production. 
On the other hand, the results obtained for regional index of integration (IOI) 
indicate that regions that were, initially, more exposed to European competition 
suffered most from the process of integration. This is most probably attributed to 
their economic-base structures. That is, regional specialisation has been, on 
average, quite unfavourable for Greek regions. This result helps to better justify 
the result on diversification discussed above. 
_______________________________Table 4____________________________ 
A more detailed account of the regional industrial structure and its deviation from 
the EU-15 average regional profile (IDIS) suggests that the more deviant in 
industrial structure Greek regions perform better in terms of industrial GDP 
growth. Looking at the evidence from a different perspective, it could be argued 
that the Greek regions that had the closer to the EU productive base were those 
experiencing the greatest difficulties in the post-1981 period. The obvious 
interpretation of this finding is that these regions were not able to handle the 
-12- competition from their European counterparts producing more or less similar 
products. On the other hand, the regions that did not have strong similarities with 
the average EU region did better. This is an indication that the process of 
integration implied for the Greek regions is of inter-industry trade relations. This 
type of trade relations is, however, associated with very limited prospects for 
structural converge with the EU. 
The picture drawn by these results gets more complete when the effects of the 
initial conditions in terms of base year industrial GDP and labor productivity are 
taken into consideration. These effects, negative and statistically significant, 
suggest that regions with higher industrial GDP in absolute terms were not those 
that subsequently had higher percentage industrial GDP growth, and regions that 
were more productive in industrial sectors were not those that experienced higher 
productivity growth. These results confirm the spatial shifts in manufacturing 
activity that were indicated in Figure 3 and the de-industrialisation process 
depicted in Figure 4 and are easy to reconcile with those obtained for the regional 
index of integration.  
On the other hand, the positive sign of the relative size of the tertiary-sector 
(TERTGDP) variable suggests that the tertiary sector in the Greek regions has 
developed in a way that has been more complementary than competitive to 
industry. Although there have been reports of abandonment of traditional 
activities in favor of tourism, especially on the islands, this trend has probably 
affected agriculture more than industry. In addition, this finding provides 
evidence for the importance of the services sectors for the performance of 
industry. The positive effect of the productivity of the tertiary sector on 
subsequent manufacturing productivity in a region accords with the previous 
finding. 
The share of capital intensive sectors (CINT) in the regional industrial base has a 
positive and significant effect on regional productivity growth. To put this result in 
a more pragmatic way, the absence of capital-intensive sectors from the local 
industry of most regions is one of the reasons for poor performance. The 
relatively insignificant presence of capital-intensive sectors in the Greek industry 
is a structural deficiency related to a number of less favorable initial conditions 
and geography and no easy cure seems to exist for it. 
The positive and significant effect of average firm size (AFS) on regional 
productivity growth provides some evidence that size matters and economies of 
scale may be one of the contributors of industrial growth. As a result, the poor 
performance of regions with respect to industrial growth is partly attributed to the 
small size of industrial firms in Greece, compared to the other EU countries. This 
-13- is another structural weakness of the Greek economy and perhaps a unique 
situation in the EU.  This small size is related to small national markets and a lack 
of access to international markets. In this case it can be attributed to the distance 
from the EU markets and the fact that the northern borders of the country were 
sealed for decades because of the “Iron Curtain”. 
The positive and significant sign of the investment incentives variable (DL) 
provides evidence in favor of the implemented industrial policies. The regions that 
received a higher level of support have managed to achieve higher rates of 
industrial growth (see the discussion on PAPADOULIS et al., 2004). However, the 
same is not evident for the per capita public investment in the base year 
(PCPUBINV).  The insignificant impact of public investment can be attributed on 
the fact that the allocation of public investment funding may not be the 
appropriate one. There is evidence for the existence of a political cycle in the 
regional distribution of funds under criteria that are not always transparent (see 
the discussion on PETRAKOS and PSYCHARIS, 2004). Moreover, there is evidence 
that interregional multipliers tend to channel significant shares of induced 
demand to metropolitan regions irrespective of the initial distribution of public 
funds (POLYZOS and PETRAKOS, 2005).  
 
5. Conclusions  
The empirical model considered in this research has provided some insight into 
the causes of poor industrial performance of the Greek regions in the period after 
membership to EU. The unusually small - by European standards - size of 
industrial firms, the lack of capital intensive sectors from the industrial base of 
most regions and the specialization in sectors that faced significant pressure in 
international markets (such as metals and textiles) are all factors that have 
contributed to this poor record. Some of these factors are embedded 
characteristics of the economy that are linked to the country’s historical paths 
and geographical coordinates. The process of EU integration, while not having 
generated any structural weaknesses in the Greek industry has, nevertheless, 
amplified them. The increase of levels of competition from the more advanced EU 
regions has forced regions with ‘similar’ industrial structure to poor records and 
industrial decline. 
Although increasing diversification could produce favorable results, the realities of 
the Greek regions indicate that only the metropolitan regions and perhaps a few 
large cities may benefit, as most regions have an industrial base with limited 
variety. As the models indicate, the other route is to base industrial growth in 
activities that are ‘dissimilar’ to those of the average EU regions. Although this is 
-14- feasible and to a certain extent does takes place, the question is to what extent 
this type of inter-industry specialization based on increasing structural 
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-20- Table 1: Industrial GDP real growth and share of industry in GDP (1980-2004) 
Year Industrial  GDP   
(million €, 1995 prices) 
Share of Industry in GDP 
(%) 
Period Industrial  GDP 
growth (%) 
 Greece  EU-15  Greece  EU-15    Greece  EU-15 
1980 9,962  4,282,866  14.59  22.65  1980-1984 -2.85  -0.97 
1985 10,292  4,622,491  14.66  21.46  1985-1989 7.49  16.00 
1990 10,544  5,405,652  13.83  22.06  1990-1994 5.67  0.52 
1995 10,802  5,934,556  13.00  20.73  1995-1999 6.01  9.42 
2000 11,632  6,798,819  12.08  20.73  2000-2004 6.77  4.93 
Source: CAMBRIDGE ECONOMETRICS EUROPEAN REGIONAL Database (2005) / Authors’ 
elaboration 
 
Figure 1: Share of Industry in GDP (1980-2004) 





























































Source: CAMBRIDGE ECONOMETRICS EUROPEAN REGIONAL Database (2005) / Authors’ 
elaboration 
Figure 2: Industrial productivity of Greece (EU-15 = 100) 













































































































Source: CAMBRIDGE ECONOMETRICS EUROPEAN REGIONAL Database (2005) / Authors’ 
elaboration 
-21- Table 2: The evolution of the industrial structure of Greece and the EU-15, NACE 2-digit 
branches, (1985, 2000) 
NACE Branches   Share in industrial GDP 1985  Share in industrial GDP 2000 
  Greece EU-15 Greece  EU-15 
DA 20.7%  14.6%  26.2%  13.1% 
DB 21.5%  6.8%  10.2%  4.2% 
DC 2.1%  1.3%  1.4%  0.9% 
DD 2.1%  3.4%  2.0%  4.2% 
DE 4.2%  8.7%  5.2%  9.2% 
DF + DG  12.4%  13.7%  18.8%  10.9% 
DH 3.3%  3.4%  4.7%  4.8% 
DI 7.4%  4.8%  7.5%  4.5% 
DJ 13.2%  13.0%  8.8%  13.1% 
DK 1.8%  11.0%  2.3%  12.2% 
DL 4.7%  9.1%  8.1%  11.2% 
DM 5.8%  8.9%  4.4%  10.8% 
DN 0.8%  1.3%  0.4%  0.9% 
TOTAL 100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
LINT 51.4%  36.1%  45.4%  32.5% 
IINT 36.3%  34.9%  39.8%  33.5% 
CINT 12.3%  29.0%  14.8%  34.2% 
TOTAL 100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
DA: Food, Beverages & Tobacco (LINT)  DI: Non-Metallic Mineral Products (IINT ) 
DB: Textiles & Wearing Apparel (LINT)  DJ: Fabricated Metal Products (IINT) 
DC: Leather Products (LINT)  DK: Machinery (excl. Electrical) (CINT) 
DD: Wood Products (LINT)  DL: Electrical Machinery & Optical Equipment (CINT) 
DE: Paper, Publishing & Printing (LINT)  DM: Transport Equipment (CINT) 
DF: Fuel Products (IINT)  DN: Other Manufactured Products (LINT) 
DG: Chemical Products (IINT)  LINT: Labor-intensive industries 
DH: Rubber & Plastic Products (IINT)  IINT: Industries of intermediate intensiveness 
 CINT:  Capital-intensive  industries 
Source: CAMBRIDGE ECONOMETRICS EUROPEAN REGIONAL Database (2005) / Authors’ 
elaboration 
 
Table 3: The average size (employees per firm) of industrial firms (2002) 


























-22- Figure 3: Regional distribution (1981) and evolution (1981-2000) of industrial GDP in 
Greece 



















-23- Figure 4: Regional share (1981) and evolution (1981-2000) of industrial GDP in Greece 




















-24- Table 4: Results of regression analysis (P values in parentheses) 
 
 Dependent  Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  Independent 
Variables 
INDGDPGR INDPROGR INDGDPGR INDPROGR 































































































Method  GLS GLS WLS  WLS 
R
2
48.9% 76,0% 59.4% 93.5% 









45 45 45 45 
The analysis is carried on 45 out of 51 Greek NUTS III due to data limitations pertaining to 
the calculation of the Theil index. 
Sources: NATIONAL STATISTICAL SERVICE OF GREECE (2005) and EUROSTAT NEW 
CRONOS Database / Authors’ elaboration  
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